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The ETHICS column explores issues around practising ethically in primary health care and aims to 
encourage thoughtfulness about ethical dilemmas that we may face.
THIS ISSUE: Our guest ethicist and GP Katharine Wallis explores the various agencies that deal with 
retrospectively and prospectively holding doctors accountable for their actions.
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I
n the good old days: ‘A doctor (unlike a 
politician or an actor) [was] judged only by his 
patients and immediate colleagues, that is, be-
hind closed doors, man to man.’1 How times have 
changed. Medicine today is more effective, more 
dangerous and more expensive than ever before, 
and the public demand for professional account-
ability is (rightly) greater than ever. It may not 
have mattered much in the past if a doctor missed 
diagnosing a leaking aneurysm, because the out-
look was bleak regardless, but today, because such 
patients can be treated and likely saved, making 
the diagnosis matters. With such power comes 
responsibility.
Responsibility may be considered synonymous 
with accountability, although responsibility 
implies being morally accountable for one’s ac-
tions while accountability implies being merely 
accountable.2 Accountability may be individual or 
collective, retrospective or prospective. Retrospec-
tive accountability is backward looking and is 
about holding someone to account for past actions 
and present consequences. The process of identi-
fying risk is central to the process of accountabil-
ity and allocating blame when things go wrong.3 
Prospective accountability, rather than looking 
back to assign blame, attempts to ensure that the 
right thing happens going forward. 
There are a number of organisations in New Zea-
land with a role to play in satisfying the public 
demand for professional accountability. While in 
most countries a tort-based malpractice system is 
used to both provide compensation for medical 
injury and to hold doctors to account, in New 
Zealand suing is barred by the no-fault accident 
compensation scheme and doctors are held to ac-
count through separate accountability processes. 
As Douglas and Wildavsky4 pointed out, the type 
of society generates the type of accountability.
Most medical professional accountability 
processes judge according to the process of care 
rather than the outcome. This might be appro-
priate, given the high degree of uncertainty in 
health care and the highly variable outcomes the 
same treatment can have in different individu-
als,2 but it is important that there is also some 
outcomes-based accountability to ensure that 
medicine is delivering more good than harm 
overall, to ensure that doctors are not seeking to 
work perfectly in a system that is delivering more 
harm than benefit. 
Medical professional accountability is important 
to maintain standards and to foster trust in the 
profession. To be accountable is to be responsi-
ble—for past actions and for future actions. To 
be accountable is to inform patients about (past 
or future) actions and decisions, to justify these 
decisions, and to suffer punishment in the case of 
eventual misconduct.2 
Retrospective accountability 
Retrospective accountability is about holding 
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The Health and Disability Commissioner 
and the Code of Consumers’ Rights
The Health and Disability Commissioner and the 
Code of Health and Disability Services Consum-
ers’ Rights 19965,6 (the Code) came into being 
following recommendations made by Judge Dame 
Silvia Cartwright in The Report of the Commit-
tee of Inquiry into Allegations Concerning the 
Treatment of Cervical Cancer at National Women’s 
Hospital and into Other Related Matters.7 Dame 
Silvia found the system of medical self-regulation 
in New Zealand wanting. She identified, among 
other factors, ‘a failure of peer review and 
consequential dominance of clinical freedom’, 
a collective abdication by medical staff of their 
collective ethical and professional responsibilities, 
and a ‘pervading atmosphere of defensiveness and 
even arrogance’.7 She concluded that she could 
not ‘leave the encouragement of new habits and 
practices to the medical profession alone’ and rec-
ommended legislative changes to increase aware-
ness of patients’ rights and public scrutiny of the 
medical profession. Hence the introduction of the 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act.5 The 
Commissioner’s role is to promote and protect the 
rights of consumers as set out in the Code:
1.  Right to be treated with respect
2.  Right to freedom from discrimination, 
coercion, harassment, and exploitation
3.  Right to dignity and independence
4.  Right to services of an appropriate standard
5.  Right to effective communication
6.  Right to be fully informed
7.  Right to make an informed choice and give 
informed consent
8.  Right to support
9.  Rights in respect of teaching or research
10. Right to complain.6
The Commissioner has a number of available 
options for dealing with complaints, although 
his powers are limited to reporting, recommend-
ing, and referring.8 The Commissioner may refer 
a complaint to the Medical Council for possible 
rehabilitation, and may investigate a complaint to 
determine whether there has been a breach of the 
Code. The Commissioner may find a breach even 
when a patient has suffered no harm. If the Com-
missioner finds a breach, the Commissioner may 
refer the complaint to the Director of Proceed-
ings for possible discipline. 
The Commissioner receives about 1300 com-
plaints per year against all types of providers 
and investigates less than 10% of these. He refers 
few providers each year for either rehabilitation 
or discipline.9 In recent years, the Commissioner 
has tended to reserve the disciplinary route for 
complaints raising ethical issues (such as bound-
ary transgressions and inappropriate relationships) 
and the rehabilitative route for complaints raising 
competence issues. The Commissioner’s decisions 
are final and neither consumers nor providers can 
appeal his decisions.
The Medical Council of New Zealand
In New Zealand, in contrast to many other coun-
tries, the competence and disciplinary processes 
have been separated so that the Medical Council 
is no longer prosecutor, judge, and beneficiary of 
fines. The Medical Council oversees competence 
issues while the Health Practitioners’ Discipli-
nary Tribunal deals with disciplinary matters. 
Colleagues have a discretion to report a doctor to 
the Medical Council if they believe the doctor 
poses a risk of harm to the public, but employ-
ers, the Health and Disability Commissioner, the 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), and 
the Courts all have a duty to do so (s.34).10 All 
patient complaints to the Medical Council must 
be referred to the Health and Disability Com-
missioner in the first instance. The processes for 
dealing with complaints and adverse events were 
streamlined following recommendations from the 
2001 Cull Report, which inquired into repeated 
complaints and disciplinary proceedings against a 
Northland gynaecologist.11
In response to competence or fitness to practise 
referrals, the Medical Council may order interim 
suspension, and/or refer the doctor to its Health 
Committee, a Performance Assessment Com-
mittee (for possible performance assessment 
and rehabilitation), or to a Professional Conduct 
Committee (for possible discipline). The Medical 
Council receives 40 to 50 referrals per year, and 
conducts performance reviews on about half of 
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The Health Practitioners 
Disciplinary Tribunal
Under the Health Practitioners Competence 
Assurance Act, the purpose of the disciplinary 
process is not to punish the doctor but to ‘protect 
the health and safety of members of the public’ 
(section 3).10 Both the Director of Proceedings 
and a Medical Council Professional Conduct 
Committee have the power to bring a discipli-
nary charge against a doctor before the Health 
Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal.
The Tribunal must consider the evidence placed 
before it and decide whether, on balance of 
probabilities, a charge of professional misconduct 
has been proven. If the Tribunal finds a charge 
proven, the Tribunal may order that the doctor be 
removed from the register, suspended for up to 
three years, censured, have conditions on practice 
imposed, be fined up to $30,000 and/or pay costs. 
All Tribunal hearings are held in public unless 
there are grounds for the Tribunal to order other-
wise (usually charges of a sexual nature). There 
are only about 10 medical disciplinary hearings in 
New Zealand each year.13
The Privacy Commissioner
Issues to deal with health information privacy 
come under the Privacy Act 1993, which gives 
the patient control over access to his or her 
personal health information and imposes a duty 
of non-disclosure on health practitioners.14 There 
are situations when disclosure is permitted to 
the extent necessary for the particular purpose 
to protect public interest considerations or the 
patient’s own safety and these are set out in the 
Health Information Privacy Code.15
The Privacy Commissioner investigates com-
plaints alleging a breach of information privacy. 
If the Commissioner finds a breach, she may 
settle the complaint through conciliation (most 
complaints end here) or refer the complaint to 
the Director of Human Rights Proceedings, who 
may bring a charge before the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal. This Tribunal has the power to 
award damages to the complainant for pecuniary 
loss suffered, loss of benefit, humiliation, loss of 
dignity, and injury to feelings.
The Coroner and the Courts
The Coroner and Courts play only a minor role 
in professional accountability in New Zealand. 
The Coroner has the power to investigate the 
circumstances and causes of a patient’s death and 
to make recommendations, and the Courts may 
hear cases of medical manslaughter.16,17 Follow-
ing reform of the Crimes Act in 1997, when the 
threshold for medical manslaughter was lifted 
from ordinary negligence to gross negligence, 
defined as a major departure from the standard of 
care expected of a reasonable person, there have 
been very few cases of medical manslaughter in 
New Zealand.18 There has been only one case of 
alleged medical manslaughter since 2000, when 
a midwife was found not guilty in 2006 for her 
management of a breech delivery which ended in 
the death of the baby.
Prospective accountability
Prospective accountability is about ensuring that 
the right thing happens going forward. Prospec-
tive accountability is linked to moral deliberation 
and extends beyond legal duty. It is concerned 
with the roles we occupy in society and the 
obligations these roles entail: as doctors we have 
a responsibility to safeguard the best interests of 
our patients and to work for the public good.19 
While the aforementioned medical professional 
accountability processes might help a patient to 
choose wisely when to place and when to with-
draw trust, these processes do not do away with 
the patient’s need to trust. As Paul20 has noted, 
external controls are ‘blunt instruments in par-
ticular cases and require a functioning internal 
morality to interpret them’. 
Ultimately, a patient must still rely on a doctor 
having a functioning internal morality, or a com-
mitment to professionalism, to integrity, compas-
sion, altruism, and continuous improvement.21 
According to Baier:
Rights do define a sort of individualist tip of the 
iceberg of morality, one that takes no extra organisa-
tion to stay afloat, but that is because it is supported 
by the submerged floating mass of cooperatively dis-
charged responsibilities and socially divided labour.22
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New Zealand Medical Association
The New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA) 
attempts to capture the ‘submerged floating mass’ 
of cooperatively discharged responsibilities in its 
Code of Ethics.23 The NZMA Code of Ethics sets 
out 67 recommendations to guide professional be-
haviour. The recommendations, unlike the duties 
imposed by the Code of Consumers’ Rights, are 
not legally enforceable. The recommendations are 
based on the following 12 Principles of Ethical 
Behaviour: 
1.  Consider the health and wellbeing of the 
patient to be your first priority. 
2.  Respect the rights, autonomy and freedom of 
choice of the patient. 
3.  Avoid exploiting the patient in any manner. 
4.  Practise the science and art of medicine to 
the best of your ability with moral integrity, 
compassion and respect for human dignity. 
5.  Protect the patient’s private information 
throughout his/her lifetime and following 
death, unless there are overriding 
considerations in terms of public interest or 
patient safety. 
6.  Strive to improve your knowledge and skills 
so that the best possible advice and treatment 
can be offered to the patient. 
7.  Adhere to the scientific basis for medical 
practice while acknowledging the limits of 
current knowledge. 
8.  Honour the profession, including its traditions, 
values, and its principles, in the ways that best 
serve the interests of the patient. 
9.  Recognise your own limitations and the 
special skills of others in the diagnosis, 
prevention and treatment of disease. 
10. Accept a responsibility to assist in the 
protection and improvement of the health of 
the community. 
11. Accept a responsibility to advocate for 
adequate resourcing of medical services and 
assist in maximising equitable access to them 
across the community. 
12. Accept a responsibility for maintaining the 
standards of the profession.
Medical Council of New Zealand
The Medical Council has developed a number of 
prospective accountability processes designed to 
protect the public and to ensure that the right 
thing happens going forward. The Council speci-
fies scopes of practice, prescribes the qualifica-
tions and experience required for registration, 
and issues annual practising certificates to doctors 
whom the Council considers are competent and 
fit to practise. The Medical Council accepts 
satisfactory participation in approved continuing 
professional development (CPD) programmes as 
sufficient proof of a practitioner’s competence and 
fitness to practise.
The Royal New Zealand College 
of General Practitioners
The Royal New Zealand College of General 
Practitioners (RNZCGP) has developed a CPD 
programme, the Maintenance of Professional 
Standards programme, for general practitioners. 
CPD programmes usually comprise continuing 
medical education, continuous quality improve-
ment, and peer review activities.
Successful peer review entails being ‘assessed by 
those who are both sufficiently informed to judge 
what they assess and sufficiently independent to 
judge it objectively.’24 Peer review, if it is to be ef-
fective and to identify strengths and weaknesses 
and determine competence, must be judgmental 
and demanding while also being supportive, and 
must overcome self-protecting etiquette. Al-
though New Zealand’s professional accountability 
processes include elements of peer review, current 
peer review processes have more educational value 
and/or provide collegial support. They will need 
to be strengthened if they are to provide satis-
factory accountability. It is to be hoped that the 
proposed practice visits are up to the task. 
The RNZCGP does not confine itself to the 
ongoing competence of vocationally registered 
general practitioners, but is also interested in 
the context in which practitioners work. The 
RNZCGP has set out the standards expected in 
practices in its Aiming for Excellence publication 
and has developed the CORNERSTONE practice 
accreditation programme.25 
There are a number of other organisations with a 
role to play in ensuring that the right thing hap-
pens in health care, including the now defunct 
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New Zealand Guidelines Group, the Health 
Quality and Safety Commission, the Best Prac-
tice Advocacy Centre, and Medsafe.
There is a risk that the processes established to 
provide accountability, especially those of a more 
bureaucratic nature, may overwhelm a doctor’s 
professional commitment to patients. As Sharpe 
warned:
The structure of ‘accountability’ orients an agent’s 
behaviour to the rules established by an oversight 
body. The accountability relationship is, thus, one 
of agent to overseer. The risk of such a relationship 
is that both agent and overseer will, in their atten-
tion to each other, lose sight of the original sphere 
of action.2
Since professionalism is the patient’s ultimate 
protector, it is important that our professional 
accountability processes are designed to foster, 
or to at least be compatible with, professional-
ism. Freidson26 was one of the first to study and 
explain professionalism, and he considered the 
type of accountability:
…most compatible with professionalism [was] colle-
giate rather than hierarchical … and loosely denoted 
by the term peer review.27 
There is much hope for the proposed practice 
review visit process then.
In conclusion, the New Zealand public can rest 
assured that a practising doctor will be compe-
tent and fit to practise, guided by moral codes of 
behaviour, and practising in a context that fosters 
the delivery of safe and effective health care. But 
should these processes fail, there are a variety of 
means by which the public can hold a doctor to 
account for past wrongs. 
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